NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**MIND GAMES:
SETTING CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL
COUNTERINSURGENCY MILITARY INFORMATION
SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

by

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December 2010

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The purpose of this study is to determine what actions can be taken by American military forces to set conditions for conducting effective Military Information Support Operations (MISO) campaigns in counterinsurgency (COIN) conflicts. To find these actions, hypotheses built upon tenets found in American military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) doctrine were compared to empirical observations of PSYOP conducted in three COIN case studies from the 1950s and 1960s. Because COIN literature is ripe with assertions, such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp's, that "effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns" are inherent in successful COIN operations, it is ironic that few works discuss specific recommendations regarding the design and conduct of such campaigns. This study begins filling this literature gap by showing that MISO relationship to other operations holds greater significance in effective MISO campaign design than internal details, such as the level of centralization. This finding supports contemporary calls for a more unified group of inform and influence practitioners within the United States military, as well as calls for the United States government to draft a National Information Strategy to better leverage this important element of national power.

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MIND GAMES:
SETTING CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARVN: Army of the Republic of Vietnam

CMO: Civil Military Operations

COIN: Counterinsurgency

JUSPAO: Joint United States Public Affairs Office

KAU: Kenyan African Union

MACV: Military Assistance Command - Vietnam

MCP: Malayan Communist Party

MISO: Military Information Support Operations (formerly known as PSYOP)

MPAJA: Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army

MRLA: Malayan Races Liberation Army

NVA: North Vietnamese Army

POG: Psychological Operations Group

PSYOP: Psychological Operations (now known as MISO)

PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare (later known as PSYOP and now MISO)

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

USIS: United States Information Service

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I.   INTRODUCTION

During the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975, many military resources were expended in the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight against the Viet Cong. One American resource in particular used in Vietnam has begun to receive renewed attention: Psychological Operations (PSYOP), which have recently been renamed Military Information Support Operations (MISO).[1] While most literature about American PSYOP in Vietnam seems to find more faults than strengths regarding its implementation, few authors have examined United States PSYOP efforts in a rigorous manner from which lessons could be derived for use in modern MISO.[2] While Dr. John A. Nagl has compared American COIN efforts in Vietnam to British COIN efforts in Malaya in his book *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, even this work only devotes three pages to PSYOP in Malaya and fails to discuss United States PSYOP activities in Vietnam. In order to help correct this omission, this thesis examines under what conditions PSYOP successfully assisted military forces in major American and British COIN conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s.[3] As a result, this thesis not only adds to the study of MISO, but also fills the void in literature about conditions under which MISO can successfully contribute to COIN conflicts.

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[1] As of June 23, 2010, the term Psychological Operations (PSYOP) was officially replaced in United States military usage with the term Military Information Support Operations (MISO). This change was initiated with a memorandum from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Commander Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, citing the need for greater recognition, understanding, and appreciation of military "inform and influence" activities.

[2] The only comprehensive study of MISO in the Vietnam War that thoroughly examined operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels known to this author is Dr. Robert W. Chandler, *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981).

[3] Even though the United Kingdom's armed forces use the abbreviation PSYOPS to refer to Psychological Operations, the American abbreviation PSYOP will be used throughout this thesis for clarity.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

What actions can be taken by Western military forces to set conditions for successful MISO campaigns in COIN conflicts? The importance of this question is two-fold. First, compared to the voluminous number of works discussing how Western military forces like those of the United States and United Kingdom can leverage maneuver or fires to their advantage on the battlefield, very few works have been written about how these forces can leverage psychological or informational actions to gain battlefield advantages. Out of the few works that do examine PSYOP in depth like Ron D. McLaurin's *Military Propaganda* or Colonel Frank L. Goldstein's *Psychological Operations*, the only work that is wholly dedicated to the conduct of PSYOP during a COIN conflict is *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam* by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Chandler.[4] Unfortunately, most other exceptional works that are devoted to PSYOP in COIN conflicts like Dr. Robert J. Kodosky's *Psychological Operations American Style* or Caroline Page's *The Limits of Persuasion* are focused on campaign failures, which are mostly at the strategic level and do not include prescriptions for remedying these failures in future conflicts.[5] As a result, this thesis begins to fill a significant gap in the literature on MISO in COIN conflicts.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to determine what actions can be taken by Western military forces (particularly British or American) to set conditions for effective MISO campaigns in COIN conflicts. These actions will be determined by comparing hypotheses to empirical observations of PSYOP conducted in three

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[4] R. D. McLaurin, *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (New York, N.Y: Praeger, 1982); Frank L. Goldstein, Benjamin F. Findley and Air University, *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA316643. Fort Belvoir Defense Technical Information Center, 1996); Chandler, *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam*.

[5] Robert J. Kodosky, *Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007); Caroline Page, *U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973: The Limits of Persuasion* (New York: Leicester University Press, 1996).

case studies of COIN conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s. Because COIN literature is ripe with assertions such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp's that "effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns" are inherent in successful COIN operations, this research has the potential to benefit current United States and United Kingdom military operations in Afghanistan.[6] Additionally, this research can also provide planners with greater insight on how to best support future American COIN activities with MISO.

C.   CASE STUDY SELECTION

Since World War II, the United States and United Kingdom have taken part in 21 COIN conflicts as either one of the main combatants or indirectly supporting one of the main combatants. Out of all 21 conflicts, American or British involvement in over half of these COIN conflicts began during the 1950s or 1960s.[7] Thus, the frequency in which American and British forces conducted COIN operations during this period make it optimum for studying how forces set conditions for PSYOP.

While the period of these case studies was selected because of the frequency American and British forces conducted COIN operations, the reason for examining the United Kingdom's COIN conflicts, in addition to those of the United States, is threefold. First, both the American and British military forces involved were very similar culturally and technologically. Second, both the United States and United Kingdom had closely linked military policy because of their common bonds through the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other similar political agreements. The third and final significant similarity between

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[6] Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May-June, 2005), 8–12, 10.

[7] See Appendix A "Post-World War II Insurgencies" taken from Frank H. Zimmerman, "Why Insurgents Fail: Examining Post-World War II Failed Insurgencies Utilizing the Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies as a Framework" (Master of Science in Information Operations, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). Lieutenant Colonel Zimmerman compiled this comprehensive list of post-World War II insurgencies primarily from the following references: Anthony James Joes, *Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook* (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996) and Sepp, *Best Practices in Counterinsurgency*, 8–12.

American and British military forces was their close cooperation with each other to include providing advisors during combat operations in the Vietnam War.[8]

In order to limit the COIN case studies examined in this thesis to those most comparable to the current conflict in Afghanistan, only COIN conflicts meeting two criteria are considered in this paper. First, a COIN conflict must involve the simultaneous deployment of at least a division or its equivalent of United States or United Kingdom troops (roughly 10,000 personnel or more). Second, each COIN conflict must have taken place in a country other than America or Britain, not domestically such as the insurgency in Northern Ireland. After these two filters were applied to the comprehensive list of post-World War II insurgencies found in Appendix A, the following COIN conflicts were selected to provide case studies for this thesis: the British Malayan Emergency, the American Vietnam War, and the British Kenyan Emergency (see Table 1: COIN Conflict Selection Criteria).

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[8] John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 130–131.

Conflict Name:	Period Waged:	Description:	Division Equivalent or Larger Involved?	Fought Domestically?
Hukbalahap Rebellion	1946-54	U.S. and Philippine Islands versus the Hukbalahap	No	No
Malayan Emergency	1948-60	Britain versus Malayan Communist Party and Malayan Races Liberation Army	Yes	No
Kenyan Emergency	1952-60	Britain versus the Mau Mau	Yes	No
Cyprus Emergency	1954-59	Britain versus Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston (EOKA)	No	No
Aden Emergency	1955-64	Britain and Aden versus Yemeni insurgents	No	No
Vietnam War	1958-75	U.S. and Government of Vietnam (GoVN) versus National Liberation Front (NLF) and Democratic People's	Yes	No
Dhofar Rebellion	1962-76	Oman and Britain versus Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), renamed later the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG)	No	No
Colombia	1964-present	U.S. and Government of Columbia versus Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN)	No	No
Weather Underground	1969-76	U.S. government versus Weather Underground	No	Yes
Northern Ireland	1969-2005	Britain versus Irish Republican Army (IRA)	No	Yes
MEChA's Brown Berets	1969-present	U.S. government versus MEChA's "Brown berets" (Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán)	No	Yes

Table 1.   COIN Conflict Selection Criteria

D.   HYPOTHESES

To build hypotheses for testing within this paper's three case studies, a combination of American military doctrine sources were used to compile a list of variables that are both fairly unique to PSYOP and doctrinally considered "important" or "essential" for the conduct of successful PSYOP. Although many of the sources used contained material that over-lapped to a moderate level, the clearest references to the variables selected listed by source is found in Table 2: Variables Impacting PSYOP Campaign Effectiveness by Source.

Variables Impacting PSYOP Campaign Effectiveness by Source				
JP 3-24: Counterinsurgency Operations (October 2009)	JP 3-53: Doctrine for Joint PSYOP (September 2003)	FM 3-05.301: PSYOP Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (August 2007)	FM 3-05.302: Tactical PSYOP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (October 2005)	FM 3-13: Information Operations (November 2003)
PSYOP in COIN conflicts require detailed cultural knowledge.	Timeliness is essential for conducting successful PSYOP.	PSYOP must be nested at all levels of conflict from the tactical through strategic.	As many forms of media as possible should be used to disseminate messaging in PSYOP.	Centralized coordination / control of PSYOP is important to operational success.

Table 2.   Variables Impacting PSYOP Campaign Effectiveness by Source.

These five variables combed out of doctrinal sources that are essential to effective PSYOP were expanded into six variables in order to better gauge how nested PSYOP were with other operations by examining them at both the strategic and tactical levels. Now totaling six variables, the refined list used in this study is as follows: cultural knowledge, responsiveness to target audience feedback, centralization of operational control, use of multiple media forms, level of consideration given to psychological factors in the strategy pursued, and level of support for other tactical operations. Although these six variables can be grouped in many ways, certain pairings make natural combinations since some variables either must go together or are typically found together. For example, in order to increase the types of media used in PSYOP, an operation will need to be conducted at a higher (and thus more centralized) level of military command to provide fuller access to multiple forms of media. Also, if PSYOP are decentralized in an effort to maximize responsiveness, then units executing these operations must have a flexible framework on which to plan their actions. Such a framework would undoubtedly be based on their mission, but would have to include at least some cultural knowledge about target audiences in order to succeed. As a result, the following three hypotheses will be used to evaluate the conditions under which PSYOP were conducted in the three case studies:

1.   If PSYOP leverage cultural knowledge and respond quickly to target audience feedback, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase.

2.   If PSYOP are more centrally controlled and use more forms of media, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase.

3.   If PSYOP are conducted in support of a strategy that leverages a conflict's psychological aspects, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase.

To further illustrate each variable's fit with the other variables used in each hypothesis, Table 3: Hypotheses Characterizations shows how the six variables are grouped into hypotheses and the over-all nature of each hypothesis.

Hypothesis #1		Hypothesis #2		Hypothesis #3	
Leveraging Cultural Knowledge	Rapid Reaction to Target Audience	Centralized PSYOP Control	Media Variety	Strategic Consideration of Psychological Factors	Support for Tactical Operations
High Congruence = Decentralized PSYOP		**High Congruence = Centralized PSYOP**		**High Congruence = Well-Nested PSYOP**	

Table 3.   Hypothesis Characterizations

The variables examined in Hypothesis 3 characterize a PSYOP campaign that is well nested with other operations at all levels within a conflict. The variables examined in Hypothesis 2 characterize a centralized PSYOP campaign where planning and execution predominantly occur at the operational or strategic level while the variables examined in Hypothesis 1 characterize a decentralized PSYOP campaign where planning and execution predominantly occur at the tactical level.

E.   METHODOLOGY

In this thesis, historical case studies of American and British COIN operations conducted in the 1950s and 1960s will be used to derive empirical observations about the conditions under which PSYOP are conducted in COIN conflicts. These empirical observations will be compared to three distinct hypotheses using the methods of congruence and process tracing to test each

hypothesis' application in three case studies. The congruence method is well suited to hypothesis testing using a limited number of cases because, as Drs. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett explain, it "... begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case."[9] To further test whether any relationships between hypotheses and the dependent variable of effective PSYOP identified with the congruence method are actually causal or merely spurious, the process tracing method will be used to refine the research results.[10] The process tracing method is well suited for this role since the hypotheses examined rely on observing two independent variables that, despite their independent effects on the dependent variable, hold the possibility of producing other interaction effects that could prove relevant to this research.[11]

Hypothesis #1: If PSYOP leverage cultural knowledge and respond quickly to target audience feedback, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase.

In order for a case study to prove this first hypothesis correct, the ability of British or American forces to plan effective PSYOP using cultural knowledge and modify these plans rapidly based on target audience feedback must be evident. Both these indicators and their importance are outlined in current American military doctrinal publications that include *FM 3-13 Information Operations* and *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency.*[12] Although other factors such as resource allocation are important to PSYOP planning and execution, they are inherently important to any military undertaking and not unique to PSYOP.

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[9] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 181.

[10] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 182.

[11] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 206.

[12] United States Army, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures: FM 3-13* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003); United States Army, *Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006).

Hypothesis #2: If PSYOP are more centrally controlled and use more forms of media, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase.

In order for a case study to prove this hypothesis correct, the PSYOP conducted by British or American forces must have been controlled in a centralized manner and incorporated multiple forms of media. The importance of these conditions for conducting effective PSYOP is further demonstrated by their inclusion in modern American doctrinal publications such as *JP 3-13.2 Psychological Operation*s and *FM 3-13 Information Operations*.[13] Historical literature on PSYOP is scarce, so often times it is necessary to gauge the level of centralization in a PSYOP based on how scarce the media it employed was in a particular theatre of operations.

Hypothesis #3: If PSYOP are conducted in support of a strategy that leverages a conflict's psychological aspects, then PSYOP effectiveness will increase.

In order for a case study to prove this hypothesis correct, United States or United Kingdom forces (both civil and military) engaged in a COIN conflict must have employed a strategy that was formed with an appreciation for the psychological impacts of planned actions and how these impacts could be used to further American or British objectives in the conflict. If PSYOP are conducted in a COIN conflict with just such a strategy, this hypothesis predicts these PSYOP will prove more effective than similar operations conducted in support of a strategy lacking appreciation of the conflict's psychological nature. Thus, the question this hypothesis asks of each case study is whether the strategy in each conflict entailed "war waged psychologically" or just conflict with psychological warfare in the form of PSYOP added as an adjunct to military operations. Several authors including Drs. Kodosky and Page have credited the lack of PSYOP coordination with government policy as being detrimental to United States military operations

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[13] United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Psychological Operations: JP 3-13.2* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010); United States Army, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures: FM 3-13*.

during the Vietnam War, which could be indicative of a COIN conflict in which war was not waged psychologically at the strategic level.[14] The conclusions about why American strategists did not show an appreciation of the Vietnam War's psychological aspects vary between these authors, but both authors clearly agree that war's over-all strategy and operational / tactical level PSYOP were not well synchronized, which resulted in devastating effects on American military efforts.

F.   LITERATURE REVIEW

The way people communicate with each other, particularly when the communication's goal is to influence another person, has been studied at varying levels by numerous investigators over the decades. While many civilian applications like marketing and mass media have benefited from this research, literature drawing upon communication theory that specifically addresses military applications has been neither common nor plentiful. While publications such as Colonel Goldstein's *Psychological Operations* and Dr. Hy S. Rothstein's "Strategy and Psychological Operations" have helped to fill this void by directly addressing PSYOP in various conflicts, very few books have holistically examined PSYOP within a specific conflict in a manner that can readily inform modern military influence practitioners about the necessary conditions for conducting effective MISO.[15] While it is highly unlikely that MISO will single-handedly win a conflict, nonetheless its practice can make significant contributions to victory, especially in COIN warfare.[16] Because of the limited body of literature focusing on military PSYOP, government service manuals such as the Army's *Field Manuals 3-05.301*

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[14] Kodosky, *Psychological Operations American Style*; Page, *U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973*.

[15] Goldstein, Findley and Air University, *Psychological Operations*; Hy S. Rothstein, "Strategy and Psychological Operations," in *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

[16] United States Army, *Psychological Operations: FM 3-05.30*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005, https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm3_05x30.pdf (accessed May 2010), 1–1.

and *3-05.302 Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* or *Joint Publication 3-13.2 Psychological Operations* are used throughout this thesis to not only standardize the terminology used to describe the conduct of PSYOP, but more importantly to provide many of the theoretical underpinnings for the hypotheses being tested.[17]

While several studies have compared American COIN tactics in Vietnam to British COIN tactics in the Malayan Emergency, such as Dr. John Nagl's book *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* and Sam Sarkesian's *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era*, these works do not spend much time examining PSYOP activities let alone comparing PSYOP in these conflicts to other relevant COIN conflicts.[18] Fortunately, this trend has recently begun to change regarding American involvement in the Vietnam War with the publication of Dr. Robert Kodosky's *Psychological Operations American Style* and Dr. Caroline Page's *The Limits of Persuasion*.[19] While both of these works cite a lack of cultural understanding and poor coordination between PSYOP and the conflict's over-all strategy, neither produce insights regarding how to correct these problems and, once corrected, if this will produce effective PSYOP campaigns.

Although many books discuss the United Kingdom's Kenyan Emergency, most of these books such as Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham's *The Myth of "Mau Mau"* focus on African nationalism, human rights, or Kikuyu tribal motivations in becoming Mau Mau more than the conflict's military operations.[20] Other books like Wunyabari O. Maloba's *Mau Mau and Kenya* and Anthony

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[17] United States Army, *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures: FM 3-05.301* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007); United States Army, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures: FM 3-05.302 w/ Change 1* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009); United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Psychological Operations: JP 3-13.2*.

[18] Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*; Sam C. Sarkesian, *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993).

[19] Kodosky, *Psychological Operations American Style*; Page, *U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973*.

[20] Carl Gustav Rosberg and John Cato Nottingham, *The Myth of "Mau Mau"; Nationalism in Kenya* (Stanford: Calif., Published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace by Praeger, New York, 1966).

Clayton's *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya* detail British military operations whose success hinged upon PSYOP. These PSYOP were characterized by counter-oathing rituals used separate individuals from the insurgency and create pseudo-gangs composed of these former insurgents who collected intelligence and fought against their former comrades.[21] Despite the credit given to British PSYOP for ending the Mau Mau insurgency, very few publications take an in-depth look at this successful PSYOP campaign and even fewer provide modern implications for the PSYOP lessons learned from this conflict.

G.   CHAPTER REVIEW

With the theoretical construction of this thesis established in the first chapter, succeeding chapters will critically test this study's three hypotheses through examining their ability to explain the conditions under which PSYOP were conducted in three case studies (Malaya, Vietnam, and Kenya). Each of the following chapters will provide an overview of either the United States or United Kingdom's military involvement in a single case study, the PSYOP these forces conducted, and finish by evaluating which hypothesis or hypotheses best explained the conflict in question's results. Following the three case study oriented chapters, Chapter V consolidates this thesis' conclusions and identifies observed trends. Finally, Chapter VI presents recommendations based on the conclusions in Chapter V for MISO in Afghanistan, possible MISO doctrinal or policy changes, and future research on this topic. In this thesis' appendices, Appendix A provides a comprehensive list of post-World War II insurgencies United States or United Kingdom military forces took part in, Appendix B provides selected maps tied to the case studies discussed, and Appendix C illustrates samples of printed PSYOP products from each case study.

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[21] Wunyabari O. Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Anthony Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya: A Study of Military Operations Against Mau Mau* (Nairobi: Transafrica Publishers, 1976).

II.   THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960)

> The shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us [the British Colonial Administration].

> - Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer, 1952[22]

A.   AN OVER-VIEW OF THE EMERGENCY

Located in the South China Sea below Thailand and above Sumatra, the modern state of Malaysia was a colonial possession of the United Kingdom known as Malaya from 1824 with the Dutch-Anglo Treaty of that year until August 1957 when it was granted full independence.[23] Covered by densely forested hills and mountains, Malaysia is as large as the states of Texas and Louisiana combined with its roughly 320,000 square kilometers of land.[24] During World War II, the British sponsored Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) fought the occupying Imperial Japanese Army as a guerrilla force until the war's end.[25] Following World War II, the MPAJA fused with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to form the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in order to help speed the promised British withdrawal from Malaya and ensure a communist

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[22] Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960* (Singapore; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 259. This quote by the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer came nine months into his service in this position which gave him complete executive authority over "all services, civil and military." Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare*, 139–140.

[23] Bryan J. Hunt, "Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya 1948-1960," *Air Power Review* 11, no. 1 (Spring 2008), 6-18, 14; Wikipedia, "Malaysia," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia (accessed September 2010).

[24] Wikipedia, *Malaysia*; Wikipedia, "Listing of U.S. States and Territories by Area," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_area (accessed September 2010).

[25] Sir Robert Thompson, *War in Peace: Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945* (New York: Harmony Books, 1982), 82.

government took power afterwards.[26] Despite its racially inclusive title, the MRLA was ethnically over 90 percent Chinese while only 38 percent of Malaya's population was of Chinese descent in 1945.[27]

Beginning in response to the murders of three European planters in 1948 by MRLA elements, the British-led Malayan colonial government declared a state of emergency that lasted until 1960.[28] Although martial law was not declared during this period that would come to be called the Malayan Emergency, United Kingdom military forces played a vital role in COIN operations against the MRLA in support of the colonial government.[29] Guerrilla activities conducted by the MRLA included occasional ambushes and assassinations coupled with an active propaganda campaign stressing the illegitimacy of British administration in Malaya.[30] In spite of killing a combined total of over 1,800 military and police members and over 2,400 civilians during the 12-year emergency, the MRLA's greatest accomplishment was the accidental assassination of Malayan High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney in October of 1951.[31]

In response to these tactics, United Kingdom civil and military forces worked through the Malayan government to segregate ethnically Chinese residents in "New Villages" under government control. Population relocation into these villages, combined with food-control measures, worked to deny the MRLA resources needed to continue their struggle. Although conventional military tactics like ambushes and sweeps generally proved fruitless against MRLA elements, indigenous Malayan forces under British leadership were able to apply

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[26] A. F. Derry, *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension* (Latimer, United Kingdom: Psychological Operations Section, Joint Warfare Wing, National Defence College, 1982), Chapter 1, 2.

[27] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 82; Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare*, 12.

[28] Hunt, *Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya 1948-1960*, 6–18, 7.

[29] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 1, 3.

[30] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 82-83; Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975), 107–108.

[31] Hunt, *Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya 1948-1960*, 6–18, 10–11.

these tactics with some success late in the emergency.[32] Tying all of these operational measures together and maximizing their effectiveness, though, were the United Kingdom's PSYOP conducted during the emergency. In fact, seven years into the emergency in 1955 when leaflet drops were at their peak, "psychological warfare operations were achieving greater successes than direct military operations."[33]

After the progress made by British High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer in the 1950s, such as granting ethnic Indians and Chinese Malayans full citizenship, increasing women's role in public life, bringing electricity to remote villages, and other projects like building schools and hospitals; in 1955 Templer's successor Sir Donald MacGillivray held elections and, in 1957, Malaya became a fully independent state.[34] The 1955 elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the anti-communist Alliance Party. This undercut whatever remaining legitimacy the MRLA maintained with Malayan citizens and caused the MCP to begin planning demobilization of the MRLA in an effort to become a legitimate political party. After being hunted down deep into the jungle and continually denied resources by British population and food control measures, by July 1960, the MRLA was totally defeated and the 12 year long Malayan Emergency declared over.[35]

B.   BRITISH PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

Originally a responsibility of the Malayan Department of Public Relations, responsibility for producing "psychological warfare" materials to use against MRLA insurgents and "propaganda" to raise public morale shifted to the Emergency Information Service staff organized by the Director of Operations for the Malayan

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[32] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 86–89.

[33] Hunt, *Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya 1948-1960*, 6–18, 11.

[34] Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," 8-12, 9; Thompson, *War in Peace*, 83.

[35] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 83.

Government, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, in 1950.[36] Headed by the former Director General of the British Broadcasting Corporation Hugh Carleton Greene, the Emergency Information Service staff at the national or federal level never numbered more than 30 personnel of which 80 percent were Chinese, 10 percent ethnic Malayas, 5 percent Indian (Tamil), and 5 percent European.[37] Below the federal level, staffs at the state / settlement and district levels were ideally composed of one Emergency Information Officer and at least one full-time Chinese assistant. Because of a shortage of qualified personnel, state / settlement level Chinese Affairs Officers often had to split their time between fulfilling their normally assigned duties and acting in lieu of a Chinese assistant for the Emergency Information Officer.[38]

Although the majority of PSYOP were coordinated and executed below the federal level, the federal Emergency Information Service staff was still able to provide substantial support and guidance to make lower level staff's outputs more effective, which made it "a model organization of its kind."[39] A good example of how the federal level Emergency Information Service staff aided subordinate staff elements can be seen in the efforts put forth by two of its Chinese members. Exceptionally gifted at producing products tailored to local audiences, these two Chinese staff members stood out for their leadership abilities and unique contributions to British PSYOP efforts during the Malayan Emergency.

The first of these two outstanding Emergency Information Service staff members was Too Chee Chew commonly known by the nickname C. C. Too

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[36] Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960*, 416.

[37] Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960*, 416; Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 3, 1.

[38] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, A-1 to A-2.

[39] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 4, 1.

given him by two American Office of Strategic Services officers in 1945.[40] Son of a Chinese millionaire and a one-time journalist, C. C. Too was not only able to understand the mentality and motivation of MRLA leaders, but often knew these figures personally.[41] Too's detailed cultural and social knowledge of the Malayan Chinese population, combined with his empathy for the "misguided" members of the MRLA, allowed him to improve the quality of PSYOP products like newspapers and leaflets while also influencing PSYOP policy. Working in conjunction with the MRLA defector Lam Swee, Too personally oversaw the publication of the *New Path News,* as well as other publications supporting British COIN efforts.[42] Also, Too's personal policy of "no hate" towards MRLA members meshed well with the government's official policy of offering amnesty and other rewards to insurgents who surrendered and began new lives away from the MCP.[43] As a result, Too "... became something of a legend in Malaya" who went on to receive the British Member of the Most Distinguished Order of the British Empire and Malaysian Knight Commander of the Order of the Crown for his work in Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) both during and after the emergency.[44]

The second exceptional member of the Emergency Information Service staff was the aforementioned defector Lam Swee. Before defecting, Lam Swee was the Party Political Commissar of the MRLA 4th Regiment.[45] In addition to

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[40] Herbert A. Friedman, "Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960," Psywar.org, http://www.psywar.org/malaya.php (accessed September 2010). Apparently the two American Office of Strategic Services officers in question had trouble remembering Too Chee Chew's full name.

[41] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 3, 1; Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs, The Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1972), 115; Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 3, 1.

[42] Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare*, 180.

[43] Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs*, 117–119. Emergency Information Service Director Hugh Carelton Greene is officially credited with recommending what C. C. Too called his "no hate" policy in 1950 when he argued the governments current "stringing them up, no matter what" policy gave insurgents no choice but to continue fighting. After Greene threatened to resign if his recommendation was not accepted, the Malayan government's policy changed so that rewards of various sorts could be offered to surrendering MRLA members (Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 1, 3).

[44] Friedman, *Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960*.

[45] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 3, 1.

helping publish a variety of literature as a member of the Emergency Information Service staff, Swee's booklet *My Accusation* about his personal experiences in the MRLA was an extremely effective product that presented very credible stories about communist abuses and fabrications.[46] Also, from 1951 on Swee proved to be very influential as a travelling lecturer explaining the errors and futility of supporting the MRLA to audiences in villages throughout Malaya.[47]

Despite being at the top of Malaya's PSYWAR organizational hierarchy, the federal Emergency Information Office's skilled staff was able to support a variety of tactical and strategic PSYOP in a rapid, effective manner with a variety of media. Even though some forms of media proved more effective with civilian target audiences while others were more influential with insurgents, the federal Emergency Information Service staff was able to conduct messaging using radio, films, ground and airborne loudspeakers, face-to-face engagements and public speeches by Surrendered Enemy Personnel, and printed products like leaflets featuring graphics produced through cartooning, illustrating, or photography.[48] Based on the writings of retired Royal Air Force intelligence officer Wing Commander A. F. Derry, the following list of media used by the Emergency Information Service in Malaya is ranked in descending order based on its effectiveness at influencing MRLA members and lists the period in which each form of media was used during the Malayan Emergency.

1. Leaflets	1948–1960
2. Personal appearance of ranking Surrendered Enemy Personnel	1951–1953
3. Government films	1952–1954
4. Airborne loudspeakers	1953–1954
5. Playlets acted out by Surrendered Enemy Personnel	1951–1954

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[46] Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 310–311.

[47] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 3, 1–2.

[48] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 4, 1.

6. Vernacular press publications	1948–1960
7. Ground-mounted loudspeakers	1950–1952[49]

Requests for customized loudspeaker broadcasts were often translated into Chinese, Malay, Tamil, or another language and ready for broadcast within 24 hours. If requests were received by the Emergency Information Service's Voice Aircraft Committee before 1000 hours, broadcasts could be available for subordinate staffs on the same day they were requested.[50] Customized leaflets took only three to five days to produce and disseminate for state or district Emergency Information Officers, as well as other entities like tactical military or police units. During leaflet drops, the federal Emergency Information Service staff was able to have customized leaflets dropped over large areas or in bundles of 5,000 over areas as small as 1,000 meters square. This allowed British forces to effectively tailor their PSYOP product dissemination to strategically cover large areas or tactically cover villages, farming plots, and other areas suspected to contain MRLA members.[51] As PSYOP efforts drew more MRLA members to become Surrendered Enemy Personnel and intelligence on the MRLA increased in quantity and quality, broadcasts and printed products were even able to effectively target individual insurgent leaders, which proved "most unnerving" to them and helped increase the number of MRLA members becoming Surrendered Enemy Personnel.[52]

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[49] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 4, 2.

[50] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 6, 2–3.

[51] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 6, 1; A. F. Derry, "Psychological Warfare in Malaya," (circa 1955), 2.

[52] Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 423–424. Short implicitly attributes the increase of MRLA becoming Surrendered Enemy Personnel in 1953 to just such individualized PSYOP products. In 1953, 372 MRLA members became Surrendered Enemy Personnel while in previous years the numbers were 257 in 1952, 201 in 1951, 147 in 1950, and 251 in 1949.

C. BRITISH PSYOP EFFORTS

From the Malayan Emergency's beginning in 1948, MCP and MRLA activities were marked by an ever increasing use of propaganda to win over the population's support.[53] Through focusing on perceived burdens placed upon the Malayan people by the British administered government like high taxes and no freedom of assembly, the MRLA actively spread propaganda verbally and in booklet form to increase their credibility *vis-a-vis* the government with the Malayan population.[54] While British leaders incrementally made political reforms that undercut many of the MRLA propaganda themes, the United Kingdom's approach to PSYOP throughout the emergency was best summarized by the Malayan Civil Servant Sir Robert Thompson when he stated:

> The main basis of a successful psychological warfare campaign will depend on a clear and precise government surrender policy towards the insurgents. Such a policy has three main aims: (1) to encourage insurgent surrenders; (2) to sow dissension between insurgent rank-and-file and their leaders; and (3) to create an image of government both to the insurgents and to the population which is both firm and efficient but at the same time just and generous.[55]

These aims were carried out through PSYOP product dissemination focused on small areas in tactical support of police or military units and strategically with product dissemination over wide areas aimed at both insurgent and civilian audiences.[56] While in 1951 these efforts' biggest contribution was a five-fold increase in actionable intelligence provided to British forces, by 1955 over 70 percent of all Surrendered Enemy Personnel used safe conduct passes disseminated chiefly as leaflets when surrendering.[57] Even aerial loudspeaker operations made a significant contribution with 91 percent of all Surrendered Enemy

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[53] Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 65.

[54] Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, 107–108.

[55] Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs*, 118–119.

[56] Derry, *Psychological Warfare in Malaya*, 3–4.

[57] Hunt, *Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya*, 6–18, 14.

Personnel who heard such broadcasts before surrendering considering them to be highly influential in 1956 alone.[58] While ultimately a combination of political actions, resource control measures, and combined military and police operations physically destroyed the MRLA ability to operate, these measures would not have proven as effective without the intelligence and credibility British PSYOP increasingly provided the Malayan government more of throughout the emergency.[59]

D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Out of the three hypotheses presented in this thesis, the United Kingdom's PSYOP during the Malayan Emergency followed the conditions-setting pattern described by the second and third hypotheses more closely than the one put forth in the first hypothesis. In Table 4: Malayan Emergency Hypothesis Testing Matrix, the relative levels of each variable found in the Malayan Emergency case study are shown along with how these levels match this study's three hypotheses. In fact, this case study matched both the second and third hypotheses' predictions to a high degree.

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[58] Hunt, *Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya*, 6–18, 14.

[59] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*; Hunt, *Air Power and Psychological Operations in Malaya*, 6–18, 16–17.

Variables:	Low	Medium	High	Level of Hypothesis Congruence
Leveraging Cultural Knowledge			X	Hypothesis #1 MEDIUM-HIGH
Frequency of Rapidly Reacting to Target Audience Feedback		X		
Level of Centralized Control of PSYOP			X	Hypothesis #2: HIGH
Variety of Media Types Used			X	
Level of Consideration for Psychological Factors			X	Hypothesis #3 HIGH
Level of PSYOP Support for Other Tactical Operations			X	

Table 4.   Malayan Emergency Hypothesis Testing Matrix

In the second hypothesis, if PSYOP were more centrally controlled and used more forms of media, then their effectiveness would increase. Throughout the Malayan Emergency, the federal level Emergency Information Service staff held defacto authority over almost all PSYOP products and messaging because only they produced printed products and voice broadcasts.[60] Thus, with face-to-face engagements and speeches made by Surrendered Enemy Personnel being the only possible exception, no product was produced for state or district Emergency Information Officers without the federal Emergency Information Service staff's approval. The forms of media used by the federal Emergency Information Service included radio broadcasts, film presentations, ground and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts, face-to-face engagements and public speeches by Surrendered Enemy Personnel, and printed products like leaflets and booklets. While all of these media were used to support lower level state and district Emergency Information Officers, authority for their use was held at the federal level throughout the emergency.

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[60] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, A-6 and A-14.

In the third hypothesis, if PSYOP were conducted in support of a strategy that leveraged a conflict's psychological aspects, then PSYOP effectiveness would increase. Whether examining the plan adopted by Direct of Operations Sir Harold Briggs in 1950 or the continued efforts of the British High Commissioners following him, such as Sir Gerald Templer, it is clear that as the Malayan Emergency progressed the United Kingdom's forces paid close attention to the Malayan population's needs and met these needs in ways that provided them a psychological advantage over the MRLA. This psychological advantage was really a credibility advantage that British forces fostered and increased in their favor. As the Briggs Plan of 1950 so succinctly described this process, United Kingdom civil and military forces would increase their credibility by providing the Malayan people security and access to information about the MRLA:

> (a) by demonstrating Britain's firm intention to fulfill her obligations in defence of Malaya against both external attack and internal disorder;
>
> (b) by extending effective administration and control of all populated areas which involves (i) a large measure of squatter resettlement into compact groups, (ii) a strengthening of the local administration, (iii) provision of road communication [sic] in isolated populated areas, (iv) setting up of police posts in these areas.
>
> (c) by exploiting these measures with good propaganda, both constructive and destructive.[61]

As a result, during the Malayan Emergency, British forces can be said to have "waged war psychologically" instead of just conducting PSYOP in support of a strategy lacking an appreciation of the conflict's psychological component.

While United Kingdom's PSYOP did match the first hypothesis in the medium-high range, British actions kept the approaches outlined in this hypothesis from being fully implemented during the Malayan Emergency. In the first hypothesis where cultural knowledge and rapid reactions to target audience

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[61] Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960*, 236–237.

feedback are required, United Kingdom forces displayed only a moderate level of reacting rapidly to insurgent actions. This is because only a small number of staff members in the federal Emergency Information Service could actually create radio or print products and the fact that this staff did not maintain full operational capability on a 24-hour basis. Given these two factors, it is unrealistic to rank British forces as having a high frequency of producing rapid reaction products for subordinate elements because of their limited periods of full manning.[62]

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[62] Derry, *Emergency in Malaya*, Chapter 6, 3. The "corner-stone" of voice broadcast product production at the federal Emergency Information Service level was a female announcer for Radio Malaya named Mrs. Tan who spoke several languages and dialects and did not mind being awoken at night to record broadcasts as needed. One can infer from this arrangement that requests of this nature were either not frequent or not frequently acted on by federal Emergency Information Service staff.

III. THE VIETNAM WAR (1950–1975)

A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WAR

With the signing of the Geneva Accords ending the first Indochina War in 1954, Vietnam was split at the 17th parallel into what would become the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam, commonly referred to as North Vietnam and the democratic Republic of Vietnam, commonly referred to as South Vietnam.[63] As a result of French military forces also withdrawing from Vietnam at this time due to the Geneva Accords, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower began providing South Vietnam economic aid to help develop its economy and strengthen its military capabilities.[64] When South Vietnam did not collapse but instead "was becoming a comparatively peaceful and prosperous state" as a result of American economic aid and military advisors, the North Vietnamese politburo decided to take action, and in 1954, began actively supporting guerrilla forces in South Vietnam that sought reunification under the North's leadership.[65] Known as the Viet Cong meaning "Vietnamese Communists," North Vietnamese sponsored guerrilla forces in South Vietnam grew to about 40,000 personnel by 1963 and were backed by an extensive network of sympathizers estimated to number over 100,000 personnel in strength.[66]

Initial attempts to stage an effective COIN campaign against the Viet Cong focused on United States efforts to reorganize and equip South Vietnam's Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) along the lines of American conventional military forces.[67] These actions, based on a strategy of attriting the Viet Cong into defeat, failed since North Vietnam's authoritarian regime could lose far more

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[63] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 188 and 192.

[64] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 194.

[65] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 181.

[66] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 186.

[67] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 193.

manpower than South Vietnam or the United States and still remain in power.[68] By 1968, Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam culminated with the Tet Offensive in which the major cities of Saigon, Hue, and 30 provincial capitals were attacked by regular and regional Viet Cong forces. Although the Viet Cong took over 30,000 casualties and were soundly defeated by American and ARVN forces militarily, domestically and internationally United States Government credibility was destroyed by the North Vietnamese forces' ability to stage such a major campaign after years of American COIN efforts in South Vietnam.[69]

After being elected in 1968, President Richard M. Nixon refocused United States military strategy in South Vietnam on "Vietnamization" in 1969, which put ARVN forces at the forefront of COIN efforts and slowly began withdrawing the 539,000 American troops deployed in Vietnam at the time.[70] With American forces down to 47,000 troops by 1972, North Vietnam took advantage of the situation by invading South Vietnam with its conventionally armed and organized North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Despite successfully capturing the provincial capital city Quang Tri, within weeks NVA forces were defeated and expelled from South Vietnam by ARVN ground forces with support from the United States Air Force.[71] In January 1973, North Vietnam and the United States agreed to a ceasefire in South Vietnam, and from this time on, American military support for South Vietnam was limited to the provision of military equipment by the embassy's Defense Attaché.[72] Two years later in the spring of 1975, NVA forces once again invaded South Vietnam but, unlike during the failed Easter Invasion in 1972, found the ARVN ground forces reduced in strength and supported by only the small South Vietnamese Air Force. After unsuccessfully facing the less

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[68] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 196–197. By the end of America involvement in the Vietnam War the North Vietnamese forces (both regular and guerrilla) had lost well over 1 million personnel while American casualties only numbered over 47,000 killed.

[69] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 208–209.

[70] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 195 and 197.

[71] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 195 and 214–215.

[72] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 195.

advanced but more numerous NVA in high-intensity combat, in April of 1975, South Vietnam unconditionally surrendered and Vietnam was unified under the North's communist rule.[73]

B.   AMERICAN PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

> General Westmoreland did not concur with the recommendation to create a J7 staff section to provide planning and oversight for PSYOP, stating "that he was the MACV PSYWAR Officer, and that all commanders would assume this same responsibility by increasing greatly their efforts in PSYWAR.
>
> -General William C. Westmoreland, 1966[74]

Much like other elements of the United States' intervention in South Vietnam, American PSYOP in Vietnam began as small, covert operations that gradually grew into overt large scale operations directed by several headquarters and supported by the United States Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) and South Vietnamese Ministry of Information. Designed to covertly "undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare," the United States' Saigon Military Mission arrived in Saigon, Vietnam on June 1, 1954 and began conducting covert PSYOP in what would become North and South Vietnam.[75] These PSYOP consisted of rumor and leaflet campaigns designed to support efforts at creating anti-communist paramilitary forces in North Vietnam while reducing communist influence in South Vietnam. Despite successfully sabotaging some fuel facilities in North Vietnam, this American mission quickly moved from conducting covert PSYOP to overt

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[73] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 220.

[74] Michael G. Barger, "Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam" (Master of Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 53. This quote was in response to a recommendation given by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) J5 Section when tasked by General William C. Westmoreland to comprehensively analyze the PSYOP structure in Vietnam at the time. This resulted from General Westmoreland's feeling that PSYOP forces were not able to support PSYWAR efforts effectively because of the quantity of American military units deployed in South Vietnam at the time.

[75] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 347.

activities after communist forces consolidated their control of North Vietnam. As a result, the Saigon Military Mission's most lasting accomplishment was quite overt; by working with the ARVN, a G-5 Section was created in the Vietnamese general staff to direct PSYWAR efforts of the newly formed Vietnamese First Armed Propaganda Company.[76]

Beginning with the arrival of what would become the 6th Battalion, 4th POG to Vietnam in 1965, United States PSYOP broadened in scope and began to focus on supporting South Vietnamese governmental efforts to communicate with its citizenry down to the hamlet level.[77] By December of 1967, the 4th POG was formed and consisted of four battalions (one in each of South Vietnam's Corps Tactical Zones) with its headquarters in Saigon.[78] Each battalion was able to deploy multiple three man teams to support units in their assigned Corps Tactical Zone consisting of up to 13 command and control teams, 33 audio-visual teams, and 32 loudspeaker teams.[79] Even though each United States Corps in Vietnam uniformly maintained operational control over their assigned PSYOP Battalions, the staff section assigned oversight of PSYOP in each corps differed widely ranging from a single officer dedicated to managing PSYOP in one corps to the entire G5 Plans Section in another.[80]

At the operational and strategic levels, United States PSYOP were theoretically centrally controlled while in actuality several organizations took part in there planning and oversight. As American PSYOP efforts grew in scope and became more overt throughout the 1950s and 1960s, three organizations oversaw this development: the United States Information Agency's overseas arm

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[76] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 347–350.

[77] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 77 and 80; Barger, *Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency*, 12. The 6th Battalion, 4th POG was known as the 1st Provisional Detachment when it first arrived in South Vietnam.

[78] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 77.

[79] Stanley Sandler, *Cease Resistance: It's Good for You, A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations,* 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: United States Special Operations Command Directorate of History and Museums, 1999), 268.

[80] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 79–80.

the United States Information Service (USIS), the State Department's United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).[81] When it became obvious to officials that effective coordination of American PSYOP was not taking place between these agencies, a new organization tasked with overseeing all United States PSYOP in Vietnam called the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was created on July 1, 1965.[82] Selected to head the JUSPAO and its diverse mix of civilian and military personnel was the former USIS Deputy Director for operations in New Delhi, India and then United States Marine Corps Reserve Colonel Mr. Barry Zorthian.[83] With supervision from the USIS and operational direction from the United States Embassy in South Vietnam, Mr. Zorthian led the JUSPAO as it attempted to coordinate and integrate PSYOP efforts of the USIS, USAID, MACV, and United States Embassy staff from 1965 to 1968.[84]

The media available to the JUSPAO and its subordinate elements like the 4th POG to disseminate messaging comprised a varied collection of capabilities that ranged from mundane items like posters to exotic ones like bars of soap. A variety of printed materials including posters, leaflets, pamphlets, newspapers, and magazines were created by the 4th POG presses and augmented by other civilian and governmental printing operations.[85] The 4th POG also operated a 50,000 watt radio station in South Vietnam while the clandestine MACV Studies and Observation Group established three black or falsely-attributed radio stations to deceive audiences in North Vietnam.[86] Through direct coordination with the

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[81] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 25. Because the United States Immigration Service used the abbreviation USIS domestically when the USIA was formed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on August 3, 1953, the use of USIS for the United States Information Service was limited to foreign operations such as those in Vietnam.

[82] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 25–26.

[83] Barger, "Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency," 16.

[84] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 15 and 26.

[85] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 27; McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 81.

[86] McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 81; Richard H. Shultz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 136.

South Vietnamese Ministry of Information, the JUSPAO helped fund the creation of South Vietnamese national radio and television stations that also included the distribution of radios and televisions to rural communities throughout the country. By 1971, it is estimated that South Vietnamese television reached 80 percent of the country's population alone, not including the audiences receiving messaging through other media.[87] Tactically, military units could be provided with customized loudspeaker broadcasts or leaflets within 24 hours and standardized products in two hours of being requested from anywhere in South Vietnam.[88] Also, a total of 2,700 former Viet Cong who defected to the South Vietnamese cause (known as *Hoi Chanh*) were formed into 36 cultural-drama teams that presented pro-government performances in rural villages.[89] This effort not only reinforced mass media appeals presented in television and / or radio broadcasts, but also complimented films presented by mobile teams under the control of JUSPAO elements like the 4th POG.[90] Some of the JUSPAO more gimmicky media disseminated in Vietnam included bars of soap encouraging Viet Cong to defect, and slide projectors displaying messaging on clouds, mountains, large buildings, etc.[91]

C.   AMERICAN PSYOP EFFORTS

> Psychological warfare and Civic Action are the very essence of the counterinsurgency campaign here in Vietnam ... you cannot win this war by military means alone.

> -General William C. Westmoreland, 1964[92]

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[87] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 34.

[88] Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 306–308; Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 82 and 85.

[89] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 33.

[90] Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 268.

[91] Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 293.

[92] Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, p. 264. This quote was taken from a speech by General Westmoreland at the 8th Quarterly Psychological Operations / Civil Affairs Conference on August 6, 1964, roughly two months after becoming the MACV Deputy Commander. Wikipedia, "William Westmoreland," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Westmoreland (accessed September 2010).

Meaning "enticement to return or welcome back" and also well known as the "Open Arms" campaign, the *Chieu Hoi* Program was the largest United States PSYOP conducted in South Vietnam.[93] Established by South Vietnam's President Diem on April 17, 1963, the *Chieu Hoi* Program sought to accomplish two objectives.[94] First, it sought to increase the solidarity of South Vietnam's citizens in order to strengthen the South Vietnamese government. Second, the *Chieu Hoi* Program sought to influence Viet Cong and NVA elements to defect by shifting their support to the South Vietnamese Government.[95] These objectives were not small tasks when one considers that in 1965 over 300,000 Viet Cong political cadre and 230,000 Viet Cong and NVA military members were estimated to live and / or operate frequently in South Vietnam.[96] In addition to actively influencing Viet Cong and NVA members to surrender through messaging and military activities, inducements were offered to *Hoi Chanh* (Viet Cong or NVA defectors) that included forgiveness for past crimes, resettlement options, and possibly even job training.[97] Although the *Chieu Hoi* Program's success varied annually depending upon United States and South Vietnamese government emphasis, many years it experienced outstanding success, such as in 1967 when it influenced over 27,178 *Hoi Chanh* to reform or "rally" to the South Vietnamese government's side.[98]

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[93] Herbert A. Friedman, *Chieu Hoi* Program of Vietnam. http://www.psywarrior.com/ChieuHoiProgram.html (accessed May 2010).

[94] Barger, *Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency*, 21.

[95] Jason T. Chaput, "The Chieu Hoi Program and Perceptions of Reality" (BA Honors Thesis, United States Naval Academy, 2000), 1.

[96] Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, "CORDS / Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review* (March-April, 2006), 9.

[97] William Rosenau and Austin Long, *The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 5; J. A. Koch, *The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1973), v.

[98] Barger, *Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency*, 38–39.

Figure 1.　　The Chieu Hoi Program's Structure and Function. Solid lines denote lines of authority or influence while dashed lines show lines of coordination.

Despite the heavy use of PSYOP assets in the *Chieu Hoi* Program, ultimately operations were controlled by civilians in the USAID until 1967 when they were placed under the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program staff consisting of both military and civilian leadership.[99] Unfortunately, at various times throughout the *Chieu Hoi* Program's existence, it suffered from a lack of personnel resources and South Vietnamese government emphasis.[100] These problems were compounded by the fact that many conventional United States military forces lacked an appreciation or understanding of programs targeting enemy forces on a cognitive level instead of

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[99] Barger, *Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency*, 22–23.

[100] Barger, *Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency*, 21–22.

just physically. One American Brigade Commander even bragged that his *Chieu Hoi* Program consisted of two 105mm howitzers, one labeled *Chieu* and the other labeled *Hoi*.[101]

Even though the *Chieu Hoi* Program was designed and overseen by civilians from its inception, as a PSYOP, it relied heavily on the 4th POG and South Vietnamese Political Warfare units to function. Some of the media employed to present *Chieu Hoi* messaging were leaflets, handbills, newspapers, radio broadcasts, aerial loudspeakers, television broadcasts, movies, and even face-to-face engagements conducted by Viet Cong or NVA defectors. After being formed into numerous armed propaganda teams, these Viet Cong or NVA defectors regularly operated throughout South Vietnam.[102] Although no metric was recorded to capture the *Chieu Hoi* Program's effect on South Vietnamese citizens, careful accounting of Viet Cong and NVA defectors was maintained throughout the war. From the *Chieu Hoi* Program's inception in 1963 through its transition to being entirely run by the South Vietnamese Government in 1971, more than 194,000 enemy combatants were influenced to defect and become *Hoi Chanh*. Even though the majority of defectors came from the Viet Cong and NVA lowest levels, this was not always the case, since even long-serving Company Commanders and district or provincial officials also defected from the communist cause.[103]

Another PSYOP related capability capitalized on by the *Chieu Hoi* Program was Civil Military Operations (CMO). While CMO may not always be thought of as part of PSYOP, its use in the *Chieu Hoi* Program clearly supported messaging efforts and provided feedback from civilian target audiences. By reaching out to potentially or highly disaffected elements in South Vietnam, *Chieu Hoi* messaging sought to rebuild South Vietnam's civil and military society in a manner that

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[101] Barger, *Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency*, 75.

[102] Chaput, *The Chieu Hoi Program*, 11–12.

[103] Koch, *The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam,* v; J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson, *Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1966), x.

would help the war effort while preparing for the peace afterward.[104] An example of these efforts was the job training provided to many *Hoi Chanh* before reintegrating into South Vietnamese society. This training served to reinforce perceptions of the South Vietnamese government's goodwill towards its citizens and prepare them for life in civil society.[105] By not only attempting to manage civilian perceptions of their government, but also actively bringing errant citizens back into the fold of legal South Vietnamese society, the *Chieu Hoi* Program's PSYOP included significant CMO elements.

In addition to containing elements of CMO, *Chieu Hoi* Program PSYOP also provided valuable intelligence on Viet Cong and NVA forces. This intelligence enabled America PSYOP to support elements of MACV counter-intelligence and physical attack operations. *Hoi Chanh* provided by the *Chieu Hoi* Program offered up intelligence not only on Viet Cong or NVA force locations, but also on weapon caches and other communist resources in South Vietnam.[106] Additionally, *Hoi Chanh* served in armed propaganda teams that furthered the *Chieu Hoi* Program, while acting in a similar capacity as the famous Kit Carson Scouts who were guides and civilian liaisons for American military units in South Vietnam.[107] The intelligence and experience these teams brought to American forces greatly enhanced the use of physical attacks to destroy communist forces in South Vietnam. Although neither the counter-intelligence nor physical attack benefits United States forces gained from the *Chieu Hoi* Program were publicized, these contributions allowed American PSYOP to make significant contributions to other operations underway in South Vietnam at the time.

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104 Carrier and Thomson, *Viet Cong Motivation and Morale*, 27–28.

105 Koch, *The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam,* vi–vii.

106 Koch, *The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam,* 71.

107 Chaput, *The Chieu Hoi Program*, 11.

D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING

> The Psychological Operations program is the least understood, the most difficult to explain, and surely the hardest to measure of any of our efforts in Vietnam.
>
> -General William C. Westmoreland, 1968[108]

Out of the three hypotheses presented in this thesis, the United States' PSYOP during the Vietnam War followed the conditions-setting pattern described by this thesis' second hypothesis more closely than those put forth in the first and third hypotheses. In Table 5: Vietnam War Hypothesis Testing Matrix, the relative levels of each variable that were found in this case study are shown along with how these levels match this study's three hypotheses.

Variables:	Low	Medium	High	Level of Hypothesis Congruence
Leveraging Cultural Knowledge	X			Hypothesis #1 MEDIUM-LOW
Frequency of Rapidly Reacting to Target Audience Feedback		X		
Level of Centralized Control of PSYOP	X			Hypothesis #2 MEDIUM
Variety of Media Types Used			X	
Level of Consideration for Psychological Factors in Over-all Strategy	X			Hypothesis #3 MEDIUM-LOW
Level of PSYOP Support for Other Tactical Operations		X		

Table 5.   Vietnam War Hypothesis Testing Matrix

In fact, no hypothesis presented in this paper predicted a high level of increased PSYOP effectiveness in this case study. While the largest PSYOP conducted by American forces in South Vietnam, the *Chieu Hoi* Program, did prove to be

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108 Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 315. This quote was taken from page 237 of General Westmoreland's *Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968* published in Washington, D.C. in 1968.

tactically successful by causing desertions in enemy forces, at the strategic and operational levels the United States failed to conduct PSYOP in any meaningful way. This stands in sharp contrast to the North Vietnamese forces who, although poor at influencing American audiences at the tactical level, conducted a "diverse, disguised, and emotionally strident" PSYOP campaign at the operational and strategic levels.[109]

For the second hypothesis presented in this study, United States PSYOP only matched its predictions to a moderate degree. Although American forces used arguably the widest array of media types ever applied to a PSYOP campaign, the high level of consistency this variable achieved was moderated by the low level of centralized control exhibited by American forces. Despite the centralized model used to plan and conduct PSYOP in Vietnam headed by the JUSPAO, "it could be said that in Vietnam, U.S. PSYOP was truly decentralized, more often than not going its own way, oblivious to JUSPAO control."[110] Adding to the decentralization of PSYOP efforts in Vietnam was American forces' habit of presenting their South Vietnamese counterparts with plans to execute, which they did not help to draft, and sometimes actually found offensive because of the terminology used in proposed messaging.[111]

In both the first and third hypotheses, United States PSYOP conducted in Vietnam only matched predicted outcomes at the medium to low level. Despite the rapid dissemination of customized PSYOP products American forces were capable of achieving, quick reaction products were "the exception rather than the rule" in Vietnam.[112] Instead, standardized leaflets and other products focused on strategic messages were frequently used, since it was common for military

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[109] Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press in cooperation with National Strategy Information Center, 1989), 212; Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 301–303.

[110] Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 304.

[111] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 226.

[112] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 88.

commanders measure PSYOP effectiveness in terms of products disseminated instead of based on actions taken by these products' target audience.[113] The level of cultural knowledge leveraged in the conduct of American PSYOP was even less than their level of reaction to target audience feedback. In addition to often excluding South Vietnamese military counterparts in PSYOP planning, most Vietnamese involved in this process worked in a subordinate position to American planners as mere interpreters, which coupled with their cultural inclination not to cause offense, set conditions in which PSYOP products were being approved for dissemination by individuals lacking the competence to effectively make such decisions.[114] This low level of leveraging cultural knowledge about the Vietnamese people, coupled with a moderate level of reacting to target audience feedback, left this case study matching the first hypothesis at only a medium to low level.

Just like the first hypothesis' match to this case study, the third hypothesis also only matched United States PSYOP in Vietnam at the medium to low level. Despite the availability of PSYOP products and personnel available to assist commanders at all levels, PSYOP were often given a lower priority to more conventional missions, which also made gathering intelligence for PSYOP an under-resourced affair throughout the war.[115] This left such operations' support for other tactical operations being moderate at best. Also, despite the emphasis placed on PSYOP by senior American commanders like General William C. Westmoreland, the United States failed to plan and implement a strategy to conduct PSYOP at the strategic level and to conduct the war itself in a manner that took account of the conflict's psychological aspects (both domestically and internationally).[116]

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[113] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 88–89.

[114] Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 240–241.

[115] Kodosky, *Psychological Operations American Style*, 172–173; Chandler, *War of Ideas*, 244–245.

[116] Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 264; Barnett and Lord, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, 212–213.

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IV.   THE KENYAN EMERGENCY (1952–1960)

From evidence coming forward from screening teams and the improved intelligence services, it is now clear that Mau Mau is wider spread and deeper rooted than was thought possible even six months ago.

-General Sir George Erskine, 1953[117]

A.   AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY

Originally part of the British East African Protectorate formed in 1895, by 1920 Kenya, with its growing number of Anglo settlers, became one of the United Kingdom's Crown Colonies administered by a British governor.[118] As a colony, Kenya contributed troops to the United Kingdom during World War II, which included native Kenyans loosely referred to as the "Forty Group" based on their year of enlistment. Although largely unknown outside of Kenya, members of the Forty Group experienced treatment as soldiers that exceeded what they were accustomed to receiving as agricultural laborers back in Kenya. This difference between life in the British Army and as an African Kenyan became even more pronounced when the Forty Group, along with every other African Kenyan, experienced a 40 percent reduction in their standard of living after World War II, while their Anglo countrymen continued to experience growing prosperity.[119]

Fostered by these perceptions of inequality and a growth in African nationalist sentiment, the Kenyan African Union (KAU) political party was formed in 1944 when Kenya's British administration lifted wartime restrictions on political

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[117] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 83. General Erskine was personally appointed by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill as the Commander-in-Chief of Colonial Kenya's armed forces in May of 1953, which not only spoke well of his professional experience, but also of his political backing in London. Wikipedia, "Winston Churchill," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill (accessed November 2010).

[118] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), "Kenya: A Chronology of Key Events," BBC, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/36/097.html (accessed February 2010).

[119] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 108–109. This statistic is based on a comparison of Anglo and African Kenyan prosperity between 1945 and 1951.

activities.[120] By 1950, a dozen members of the KAU drawn from the Kikuyu Tribe, which dominated the party, decided that more active measures were needed to address economic injustices imposed upon Kenyan Africans by the British administration. This resulted in the formation of the Kiambaa Parliament that signaled the start of Kikuyu resistance organizations and would come to be called the Mau Mau by British authorities.[121] Unlike other resistance organizations that found unity from and recruited with an ideology like Communism, the loosely grouped units forming the "Land Freedom Army" or "Freedom Struggle Association," termed Mau Mau by the British, were unified by an oath of allegiance.[122] By incorporating elements of traditional Kikuyu tribal ceremonies and breaking strongly held taboos, these oaths and their accompanying ceremonies served to "psychologically mark" oath takers and provide the Mau Mau with recruits and resources. An example of the basic "unity oath," which brought recruits, willing or not, into the Mau Mau movement is shown below.[123]

> I speak the truth and vow before God
> And before this movement.
> The movement of Unity,
> The Unity which is put to the test
> The Unity that is mocked with the name of "Mau Mau,"
> That I shall go forward to fight for the land,
> The lands of Kirinyaga that we cultivated,
> The lands which were taken by the Europeans
> And if I fail to do this
> May this oath giver kill me,
> May this seven kill me,
> May this meat kill me.
> I speak the truth that I shall be working together
> With the forces of the movement of Unity
> And I shall help it with any contribution for which I am asked,

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[120] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 1; William R. Polk, "Kenya and the Mau Mau," in *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2007), 107-123, 110–111.

[121] Polk, *Kenya and the Mau Mau*, 107-123, 111.

[122] Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 2; Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 102–103.

[123] Polk, *Kenya and the Mau Mau*, 107-123, 112; Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 98–113.

I am going to pay sixty-two shilling and fifty cents and a ram for the
movement
If I do not have them now I shall pay in the future
And if I fail to do this
May this oath kill me,
May this seven kill me,
May this meat kill me.[124]

In October of 1952, Mau Mau activities designed to increase their resources and span of control resulted in the murder of Kikuyu Senior Chief Waruhiu, one of the British administration's staunchest allies.[125] Chief Waruhiu's murder, coupled with increasing lawlessness throughout the colony, caused the United Kingdom to officially declare Colonial Kenya as being in a state of emergency. Under the leadership of Kenya's British governor, the "weak, sickly, and often ... indecisive" Sir Evelyn Baring, additional military units were requested and sent to help quell the emergency consisting of regular British Army units and colonial African units.[126] The first major operation conducted by British forces, OPERATION JOCK SCOTT from 20–21 October of 1952, resulted in the opening of detention camps and detention of numerous Kikuyu political figures to include the controversial Jomo Kenyetta. While Anglo Kenyans felt these measures were productive, since politicians like Jomo Kenyetta were thought to have instigated the Mau Mau movement, African Kenyans perceived these events quite differently.[127] As a result, the 12,500 Mau Mau thought to be active combatants in 1952 soon grew in number to over 100,000 within roughly one year.[128]

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[124] Polk, *Kenya and the Mau Mau,* 113–114. Although this oath is indicative of the Unity Oath, at its best the Mau Mau were a loosely organized group so minor variances in oaths or oathing ceremonies were not uncommon. Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 98–113.

[125] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 108.

[126] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 81–82.

[127] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 109. Jomo Kenyatta's links to the Mau Mau have never been solidly established. After being released from prison after the emergency's end, Kenyatta was elected Kenya's first president.; Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 21.

[128] Thompson, *War in Peace*, 108; Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 22–23.

Despite the Mau Mau insurgency's growth, British forces (both civil and military) in Kenya still lacked a coherent strategy for conducting COIN operations against and collecting intelligence on the Mau Mau in early 1953.[129] After the night of March 26, 1953, it was obvious this situation was intolerable. On that night, Mau Mau forces raided the Naivasha Police Station in the Rift Valley where they freed over 150 prisoners and captured a large quantity of small arms and ammunition (to include machineguns). On that same evening, Mau Mau forces attacked the Central Province's village of Lari where 97 African Kenyan civilians were killed and 29 wounded.[130] As a result of the frustration this caused the United Kingdom's government at its highest levels, Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill personally selected and assigned General Sir George Erskine to take command of all Kenya's security forces in May 1953.[131]

Recognizing that British forces' ability to collect timely and accurate information on the Mau Mau was critical to waging a COIN campaign, General Erskine expanded the British Intelligence Section's Special Branch, which included expanding the military's network of Field Intelligence Officers and Assistants throughout Kenya.[132] This resulted in an exceptional increase in information on the Mau Mau insurgents, since it not only coordinated the efforts of intelligence personnel with operational forces, but it also led to the innovative formation of pseudo-gangs composed of Mau Mau, who agreed to turn on their former comrades. Initially pioneered by a Field Intelligence Officer named Frank Kitson, by 1954 pseudo-gangs had infiltrated Kikuyu tribal reservations and were preparing to expand operations into Mau Mau held jungle highlands, which they did in early 1955.[133]

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[129] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 82–83.

[130] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 100–101.

[131] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 82–83.

[132] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 83–84; Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 34.

[133] Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 34–35.

Also in 1954, General Erskine's assault on the Mau Mau infrastructure began in earnest with OPERATION ANVIL in April. Featuring a large cordon and police search in Kenya's capital city Nairobi, OPERATION ANVIL eventually moved about 30,000 African Kenyans from the city into detention camps.[134] After OPERATION ANVIL successfully neutralized a great deal of the Mau Mau's support infrastructure, further military and police operations kept pressure on the Mau Mau, while amnesty programs allowed insurgents to break with the movement by surrendering and renouncing their initiation oaths.[135] One such effort that relied heavily on PSYOP to offer amnesty was the "Green Branch" surrender appeal that resulted in over 800 Mau Mau surrenders by January of 1955.[136] Culminating with the Mau Mau's most notable leader Dedan Kimathi's capture in October 1956, British COIN operations heavily attrited the Mau Mau and placed them on a defensive posture from which their organization would not recover.[137] Although the United Kingdom's military forces sent to Kenya for the emergency were withdrawn in by the end of 1956, the state of emergency remained in effect until January 1960 in order to prevent a Mau Mau resurgence by continuing to detain thousands of Mau Mau members and their supporters from the Kikuyu tribe.[138]

B.   BRITISH PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

Unlike other case studies presented in this paper, the United Kingdom's PSYOP organization in Kenya during the emergency was quite decentralized with different parts of the colonial government and military employing various PSYOP capabilities quite independently to assist in the common struggle against the Mau Mau. Printed products were generally produced by the government's printing office and distributed to British civil and military agencies for dissemination by the government's Department of Information of Kenya. The government also

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[134] Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 25; Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 86–87.

[135] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 86–87 and 74–75.

[136] Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 25.

[137] Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 31.

[138] Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 31; Thompson, *War in Peace*, 108.

distributed radio sets to rural villages on which government broadcasts could be heard and published various periodicals like newspapers that carried anti-Mau Mau themes and messages.[139] As the conflict progressed, government print and broadcast functions were consolidated into the African Information Service agency although they still did not control military PSYOP or tactical product dissemination.[140] British military intelligence officers working with the police force's Special Branch ran pseudo-gang operations in which Mau Mau insurgents were turned against their former comrades. At first, a British Foreign Intelligence Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer in "black face" would accompany these teams of former Mau Mau as they collected information about their former comrades or other insurgent elements, but after proving effective teams wholly composed of reformed Mau Mau were dispatched. Known as Special Force Teams, these groups of former insurgents were organized as an independent arm of the police force and specialized not only in intelligence collection, but also in actively attacking Mau Mau elements during their operations.[141] Even though military and civil agencies worked closely together in the field during the emergency's latter stages, General Erskine never possessed any formal control over the colonial government. This stems from the fact that, although he was given the power to do so, neither General Erskine nor his successor ever enacted martial law during the emergency.[142] Ultimately, because of the various civil and military agencies contributing to PSYOP in Kenya with their differing missions and resources, the United Kingdom's PSYOP during the Kenyan

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[139] Friedman, "PSYOP of the Mau Mau Uprising."

[140] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 108–109.

[141] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 94–95.

[142] Anthony Clayton, *The Killing Fields of Kenya, 1952-1960: British Military Operations Against the Mau Mau* (Nairobi: Transafrica Press, 2006), 7-8. General Erskine was provided the authority to enact martial law at any time he saw fit in a letter provided to him by the British government before arriving in Kenya. After appraising conditions on the ground, General Erskine felt such a declaration was unnecessary for dealing with the Mau Mau (although he considered using it to keep Anglo Kenyan settlers in check) and kept the letter in his glasses case for the duration of his tour.

Emergency ended up being a very decentralized combination of activities executed at all levels that contributed toward a common goal.

C. BRITISH PSYOP EFFORTS

> I will not tolerate breaches of discipline leading to unfair treatment of anybody ... But I most strongly disapprove of "beating up" the inhabitants of this country just because they are the inhabitants.
>
> -General Sir George Erskine, 1953[143]

As discussed previously, British forces in Kenya did not field an organization with consolidated control over their PSYOP during the emergency. Still, though, the United Kingdom's PSYOP efforts followed three clearly defined lines of operation. The first line of operations involved taking actions that sought to correct any unfair conditions or treatment contributing to the Mau Mau's recruiting and support efforts. This section's opening quote by General Erskine is a good example of one way this line of operations was applied. Aside from just ordering security forces to quit mistreating African Kenyans, this order was reinforced with specific instructions for units to stop offering cash payments or other forms of recognition for every African Kenyan killed by security force personnel because they were ostensibly a Mau Mau.[144] Another example of this line of operation is a program known as the Swynnerton Plan. In this plan, communally held tribal lands were consolidated and then parceled out individually to African Kenyans who remained loyal to the colonial government. Even though this plan did not create the African Kenyan conservative middle-class British officials hoped for, it did provide African Kenyans a chance to gain titles establishing legal land tenure. This alone was very significant, since before

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143 Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, 38–39. This quote is taken from an open letter written by General Erskine to all of the security forces (both military and police) under his command regarding their conduct of COIN operations in Kenya.

144 Clayton, *The Killing Fields of Kenya*, 39.

this plan African Kenyan land ownership had been undermined by generations of Anglo Kenyan land appropriation throughout the colony.[145]

The second line of operations involved various counter-oathing efforts.[146] Unlike other insurgencies where insurgents were unified by an ideology based on political or religious dogma, the Mau Mau movement resorted to oaths combining tribal symbolism with the breaking of taboos to gain recruits, sympathizers, and even material resources by "psychologically marking the oath taker."[147] Thus, it was imperative that British forces found some way of countering the Mau Mau's oathing in order to truly hobble the flow of people and supplies into their movement. With the assistance of various Christian organizations in Kenya, the colonial government appointed loyal tribal doctors and medicine men to administer an oath breaking any Mau Mau oath's power over the oath taker once they had confessed to any Mau Mau activities in which they took part.[148] In addition to providing British forces another conduit with which to gather intelligence, tribal counter-oathing also began a process through which former Mau Mau members could freely return to civil society at some point.[149]

Finally, the third line of operations involved disseminating printed materials such as leaflets, posters, and booklets throughout Kenya and even to a limited extent internationally in order to eliminate the Mau Mau's popular support. Emphasizing the criminality and / or depravity of the Mau Mau and their oathing

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[145] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 145–146.

[146] Although authors such as William R. Polk in his book *Violent Politics* (Harper-Collins, 2007) have referred to this practice as "unoathing," it actually relies upon an oath of loyalty to the colonial government that nullifies or breaks the Mau Mau Oath's power. As a result, the term "unoathing" is rather misleading while "counter oathing" more accurately describes what was taking place.

[147] Polk, *Kenya and the Mau Mau*, 107–123, 112.

[148] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 74–75 and 87. Among Europeans in Kenya during the emergency these tribal counter-oathing officials were humorously known as "Her Majesty's witch doctors."

[149] Clayton, *The Killing Fields of Kenya*, 16–17. Even after being administered a counter-oath, former Mau Mau members could be held indefinitely at detention camps outside of central Kenya depending upon the classification of their Mau Mau involvement as being hard-core or black (Z1), intermediate or grey (Y1), or the lowest level of involvement white (Y2).

rituals, British PSYOP products not only caused Anglo Kenyans and older African Kenyans to view the Mau Mau movement with horror, but also saturated the Information Environment with more products than any Mau Mau organization could ever come close to producing.[150] While leaflets featured messages encouraging Mau Mau to surrender, government produced "horror books" presented graphic pictures of people killed by Mau Mau violence designed to shock viewers and reinforce the credibility of government COIN efforts.[151] Besides Royal Air Force leaflet drops in support tactical operations, the only other PSYOP "product" readily available to tactical level military and police units were the tribal leaders taking part in counter-oathing activities.

D.   HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Out of the three hypotheses presented in this thesis, British PSYOP during the Kenyan Emergency most closely followed the conditions-setting pattern described by first and third hypotheses and matched the second hypothesis' predictions at only a medium to low level. In Table 6: Kenyan Emergency Hypothesis Testing Matrix, the relative levels of each variable found in the Kenyan Emergency case study are shown along with how these levels match this study's three hypotheses.

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[150] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 10.

[151] Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, 108–109.

Variables:	Low	Medium	High	Level of Hypothesis Congruence
Leveraging Cultural Knowledge			X	Hypothesis #1 HIGH
Frequency of Rapidly Reacting to Target Audience Feedback			X	
Level of Centralized Control of PSYOP	X			Hypothesis #2 MEDIUM-LOW
Variety of Media Types Used		X		
Level of Consideration for Psychological Factors in Over-all Strategy			X	Hypothesis #3 HIGH
Level of PSYOP Support for Other Tactical Operations			X	

Table 6.   Kenyan Emergency Hypothesis Testing Matrix

Probably the most interesting aspect of this case study is the role one PSYOP line of operations played in producing high levels of the observed variables. Because the process of counter-oathing directly enabled the formation of pseudo-gangs, and these pseudo-gangs (as well as the counter-oathing) operated at the lowest tactical levels, this single line of operations provided effective, decentralized, and highly responsive PSYOP support to police and military units in and unprecedented manner throughout Kenya.

In the first hypothesis, high levels of both variables are observed in this case study due solely to the counter-oathing operations. For the counter oaths to work, much less inspire former Mau Mau to turn on their comrades, a solid understanding of Kikuyu tribal culture and grievances was needed. By understanding how issues like land ownership motivated African Kenyans of the Kikuyu tribe to join the Mau Mau, messages could be produced that would help make taking part in counter-oathing rituals desirable, especially in periods of increased pressure from British security forces. Unlike British PSYOP in other conflicts that relied primarily on mass media, the face-to-face communication relied upon to conduct counter-oathing, and thus, pseudo gang operations put such measures within easy reach of even the

smallest military and police elements both in garrison and field environments. This allowed these forces to instantaneously respond to target-audience feedback in real time much to the chagrin of embattled Mau Mau groups in the area.

In the third hypothesis, counter-oathing and the pseudo-gangs such rituals produced also resulted in high levels of the variables being observed. Because the information gained and disruption caused within Mau Mau organizations as a result of this line of operations, these activities gained greater prominence throughout the conflict and, towards late 1955, even began to over-shadow more conventional military operations in both priority and effectiveness. As a result, it would not be an over statement to say that PSYOP in the form of counter-oathing and pseudo-gangs supported tactical operations so well, they replaced many more conventional patrols and cordons previously conducted by British forces. Viewed within the context of General Erskine's strategy, this and other lines of operation such as trying to remedy the population's grievances combined to provide an excellent example of "war being fought psychologically."

Unlike the other two hypotheses, though, only medium to low levels of the variables discussed in hypothesis two were found in this case study. As discussed earlier, PSYOP in the form of counter-oathing and pseudo-gangs were highly decentralized in planning and execution. Also, even though British forces used radio and print products, compared to the types of media employed in other theatres only a moderate number were used in Kenya. Whether this was a function of other PSYOP success or trying to minimize monetary expenditures, British forces never employed all of the media types they controlled to deal with the Kenyan Emergency.[152]

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[152] Clayton, *The Killing Fields of Kenya* "Publisher's Note." The British Government spent over £500 million to quell the Mau Mau during the Kenyan Emergency not including expenditures put forth by Kenya's colonial government for the same cause.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior - of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between.

-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 2007[153]

A. REVIEW OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS

As alluded to by Secretary Gates' quote above, MISO have a vital role to play in securing national interests because of their potential to shape people's behavior through the targeted use of information. Whether MISO live up to their potential or not, though, is matter of campaign planning. To assist in this process, this paper has examined three COIN case studies during a period of peak involvement in such conflicts by American and British forces to see how they set conditions for conducting effective PSYOP. Although what this study found is hardly revolutionary, it is evolutionary in that these findings reinforce contemporary calls for a more unified force of personnel conducting inform and influence operations within the American military.[154] Also, this study's finding supports many commentators' calls for the United States to adopt a National Information Strategy to guide the conduct of American Information Operations and its component parts such as MISO.[155]

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[153] United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Psychological Operations: JP 3-13.2*, IV-1.

[154] Huba Wass de Czege, "The Art of 'Campaigning' to Inform and Influence," *Small Wars Journal* (September 5, 2010), 34–37. In this article retired Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege argues for consolidating the Army's current inform and influence career tracks of Public Affairs, Information Operations, and PSYOP into the "Public Information" and "Influencing Hostiles" (36) career tracks. While his approach to consolidation of these functions has its unique points, it is not unique among contemporary critics who argue the Army's approach to inform and influence operations should include consolidating their current career fields in some manner.

[155] IO Blog (November 22, 2009). This blog's author, Mr. Joel Harding, is the Director of the Information Operations Institute for the Association of Old Crows and mirrors opinions expressed in other products from think-tanks such as the Heritage Foundation. Blankley, Tony, Helle C. Dale, and Oliver Horn, *Reforming U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2008) http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/bg2211.pdf (accessed November 2010).

Case Study:	Hypothesis #1		Hypothesis #2		Hypothesis #3	
	Leveraging Cultural Knowledge	Rapid Reaction to Target Audience	Centralized PSYOP Control	Media Variety	Strategic Consideration of Psychological Factors	Support for Tactical Operations
Malayan Emergency	High	Medium	High	High	High	High
	Medium-High		High		High	
Vietnam War	Low	Medium	Low	High	Low	Medium
	Medium-Low		Medium		Medium-Low	
Kenyan Emergency	High	High	Low	Medium	High	High
	High		Medium-Low		High	

Table 7.   Consolidated Hypothesis Testing Matrix

In Table 7: Consolidated Hypothesis Testing Matrix, the level of congruence between each hypothesis tested and each case study examined is shown. At first glance, it is apparent that case studies of British PSYOP contained equal or higher levels of the variables being observed than the case study of American PSYOP among all variables but one.[156] While one can infer this relationship has something to do with each conflict's eventual outcome—the United Kingdom achieving its goals in both Malaya and Kenya while the United States failed to do so in Vietnam—such a leap is outside of this study's scope and tenuous at best until more research is done on the topic of MISO relationship to strategy as an indication of COIN success. What this does indicate, though, is the possibility that certain hypotheses examined have greater influence in producing effective PSYOP either individually or in combination.

Further examination of Table 7: Consolidated Hypothesis Testing Matrix focusing on how hypotheses results relate to one another yields an interesting observation. The variable levels observed in a case study for the third hypothesis were seen in at least one other hypothesis tested in that case study. For example, the over-all high level of congruence the Malayan Emergency case

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[156] The only instance where higher levels of an observed variable were found in the Vietnam War case study in comparison to the other two case studies is when media variety is compared. American forces in Vietnam conducted PSYOP messaging with a wide variety of media types while British forces in Kenya relied heavily upon face-to-face communication augmented by printed products despite having access to other types of media.

study showed for Hypothesis 3 was matched by its high level of congruence for Hypothesis 2. The over-all medium to low level of congruence the Vietnam War case study showed for Hypothesis 3 was matched by its medium to low level of congruence for Hypothesis 1. This trend holds true only for Hypothesis 3 and is consistent in all three case studies examined. While this trend is significant, it will take further research to validate its existence in case studies covering different periods and in PSYOP conducted by different nations (such as Russian or Chinese PSYOP case studies).

What makes Hypothesis 3 so significant that it influences either Hypotheses 1 or 2? This question is answered by looking back to character of each hypothesis as discussed in Chapter I, Section D: Hypotheses. The variables examined in Hypothesis 3 characterize a PSYOP campaign that is well nested with other operations at all levels within a conflict. Thus, the essential question that Hypothesis 3 asks of a case study is "How did PSYOP relate to other operational elements within this COIN conflict?" At the strategic level, if a conflict is waged in a manner accounting for the contest's psychological aspects and, at the tactical level, if operations are well supported by PSYOP, then a conflict will display high levels of congruence with Hypothesis 3. These high levels of congruence would indicate that Hypothesis 3's essential question would be answered "Closely, with operational connections at all levels."

The variables examined in Hypothesis 2 characterize a centralized PSYOP campaign where planning and execution predominantly occur at the operational or strategic level while the variables examined in Hypothesis 1 characterize a decentralized PSYOP campaign where planning and execution predominantly occur at the tactical level. Thus, the essential question that both Hypotheses 2 and 1 ask of a case study is "At what level were PSYOP controlled within this COIN conflict?" A conflict where PSYOP are centrally controlled and use a wide variety of media types to dissemination messaging would display high levels of congruence with Hypothesis 2. Similarly, a conflict where PSYOP were not centrally controlled and relied upon cultural knowledge to rapidly react to target

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audiences would display high levels of congruence with Hypothesis 1. Depending upon which hypothesis was most congruent, Hypotheses 2 and 1's essential question would be answered "At higher / lower levels leading to centralized / decentralized operations."

Consequently, because Hypothesis 3 examines PSYOP relationship to a COIN conflict's over-all operations, it stands to reason that it held greater influence over PSYOP effectiveness than Hypotheses 2 or 1, which both examined internal components of a conflict's PSYOP campaign. Even though the scope of this study is too small to definitively determine whether Hypothesis 1's decentralized control or Hypothesis 2's centralized control techniques were more effective, this study does show PSYOP campaigns functioning in a decentralized manner do tend to set conditions that are more conducive to effective PSYOP than more centralized campaigns. Based on these findings, further research taking a more focused view of the variables this study combined as Hypothesis 3 is warranted to explore how MISO can be better nested into other operations throughout the spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity operations. Also, further research involving a greater number of case studies in which factors influencing whether centralized or decentralized MISO are more appropriate for a certain type of conflict (such as COIN) should be explored.

B.   CONCLUSIONS

As retired Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson stated in his epilogue to Colonel Frank Goldstein's book *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*, "These authors lead us to believe correctly that the PSYOP weapon system, if employed properly, must ... be systematically integrated with U.S. national security policy and objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict ..."[157] This is not only wise advice for leveraging any element of national power, but, as the dominant effect of Hypothesis 3 in this study shows, is likely the most important factor in setting conditions for successful MISO. In order to facilitate

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[157] Goldstein, Findley and Air University, *Psychological Operations*, 358.

such integration, it is important that MISO or, more appropriately, inform and influence operations are given one proponency within the American Army to oversee such efforts. While different American military services handle the proponency and manning for their inform and influence professionals differently, the United States Army, whose force of such professionals is likely the largest, currently dilutes these professionals organizational influence by leaving them split into three separate career fields (Public Affairs, Information Operations, and MISO). Although the United States Army's organizational design for the inform and influence functions was not covered by this study, the conclusions reached in this study do directly affect the appropriateness of current Army organizational design.

C.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Based upon this study's findings and current issues being discussed within the United States Army's inform and influence career fields (Public Affairs, Information Operations, and MISO), the following topics comprise areas where further study would help to define and refine the planning and execution of MISO and the Information Operations of which they are a component.

1) How important is the integration of MISO into campaign strategy for achieving operational goals / objectives in a COIN conflict?

2) Just as in this study, do the variables found in Hypothesis 3 (degree to which "war is waged psychologically" and MISO support tactical operations) determine the level of MISO effectiveness in case studies set in different periods or examining different nation's PSYOP efforts (such as Russian or Chinese PSYOP case studies)?

3) Aside from the two variables examined in Hypothesis 3 (degree to which "war is waged psychologically" and MISO support tactical operations), what other unexamined variables effect how MISO are better nested into other operations throughout the spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity operations?

4) Under what conditions in a certain type of conflict (such as COIN operations) are centralized / decentralized MISO more or less appropriate regarding campaign planning and execution?

APPENDIX A: POST-WORLD WAR II INSURGENCIES[158]

The list below is a comprehensive listing of all insurgencies United States or United Kingdom military forces were involved with after World War II.

Location or Conflict Name:	Duration:	Combatants:
Palestine	1945-1948	Britain versus Jewish separatists
Greek Civil War	1945-1949	Britain then the U.S. and the Government of Greece versus the National Liberation Army
Philippines (Hukbalahap Rebellion)	1946-1954	U.S. and Philippine Islands versus the Hukbalahap
Malayan Emergency	1948-1960	Britain versus Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan Races Liberation Army
Kenya Emergency	1952-1960	Britain versus the Mau Mau
Cyprus	1954-1959	Britain versus the Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston
Oman	1955-1959	Britain and Jebel Akhdar versus Talib
Aden Emergency	1955-1967	Britain and Aden versus Yemeni insurgents

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[158] Zimmerman, *Why Insurgents Fail.*" Zimmerman compiled the comprehensive list of post-World War II insurgencies this Anglo-American focused list is taken from with the following references: Joes, *Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook* and Sepp, *Best Practices in Counterinsurgency*, 8-12.

Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia	1958-1975	U.S. and the Government of Vietnam versus the National Liberation Front and Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam
Dhofar	1962-1976	Britain and Oman versus the Dhofar Liberation Front renamed later the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf
Colombia	1964-present	U.S. and Government of Columbia versus the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and National Liberation Army
United States	1969-1976	U.S. government versus the Weather Underground
Northern Ireland	1969-present	Britain versus the Irish Republican Army
United States	1969-present	U.S. government versus the Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán
Philippines	1970-present	U.S. and the Philippine Government versus the Moro National Liberation Front / Moro Islamic Liberation Front
United States	1971-1981	U.S. Government versus the Black Liberation Army
United States	1971-1975	U.S. Government versus the Symbionese Liberation Army

Salvadoran Civil War	1979-1991	U.S. and the Government of El Salvador versus the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
Somalia	1992-1994	U.S. and the United Nations versus Somali warlords and armed factions
Afghanistan	2001-present	U.S., NATO, and the Government of Afghanistan versus the Taliban
Iraq	2003-2010	U.S. led coalition and the Government of Iraq versus Jihadists and insurgents

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APPENDIX B: SELECTED MAPS

The map in Figure 2 shows Colonial Malaya as it appeared during the Malayan Emergency.

Figure 2.   Colonial Malaya[159]

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[159] Friedman, *Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960.*

Shown in Figure 3 is a map of South Vietnam's military and administrative regions circa June 1967.

Figure 3.   South Vietnam circa 1967[160]

[160] Wikipedia, "South Vietnam," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2d/Southvietmap.jpg (accessed November 2010).

The map in Figure 4 shows Kenya much as it looked during its time as a colonial possession of the United Kingdom.

Figure 4.   Kenya[161]

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[161] Wikipedia, "Kenya," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kenya-relief-map-towns.jpg (accessed November 2010).

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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE PSYOP PRODUCTS

Although not only printed media was used in the British and American PSYOP case studies discussed in this paper, the printed media displayed in this appendix were selected because they displayed the most prominent PSYOP themes and messages used by COIN forces in each conflict being discussed. These samples are not meant to be a comprehensive collection of products disseminated in a given conflict, but do give readers a better feel for the types of products insurgents were exposed to in the case studies discussed.

A.   SAMPLE U.K. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN MALAYA

In this section featuring examples of printed PSYOP products used by the British in the Malayan Emergency, all graphics, text, and translations were obtained from retired Sergeant Major Herbert Friedman's article "Psychological Warfare of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960" found on the Psywar.org website that was accessed on October 14, 2010 at http://www.psywar.org/malaya.php.

Figure 5.   Merdeka Offer

In Figure 5: Merdeka Offer a two-sided Merdeka amnesty leaflet is shown. The code "HPWS" stands for Head, Psychological Warfare Section. On the front, it depicts the letter to the insurgents at left signed by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the English language text along the right side and bottom reads:

> THIS MERDEKA OFFER IS NOW EXTENDED TO THE 30TH APRIL 1958.

> ATTENTION

> THE GUARANTEE THAT GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PROSECUTE THOSE COMMUNIST HELPERS WHO ASSIST IN INDUCING M.C.P PERSONNEL TO ACCEPT THIS OFFER IS ALSO EXTENDED UNTIL 30TH APRIL 1958.

The back of the leaflet features a safe conduct message in English and the three main Malay languages. It is:

SAFE CONDUCT PASS

TO MCP PERSONNEL

1. This safe conduct pass will help you come out of the jungle safely.

2. Wave this safe conduct pass when you meet anyone.

TO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

1. The bearer of this SAFE CONDUCT PASS wishes to leave the jungle and come out to the authorities.

2. Please help the bearer to do so - there will be a reward for you.

Notice that the leaflets no longer use the word 'Surrender,' but instead say 'come out.' It was believed that this would make it easier for the Chinese guerrilla to defect while saving face.

Figure 6.   Rewards for the Capture of Communist Terrorists

Another typical leaflet is Figure 6. Rewards for the Capture of Communist Terrorists, which can be found in three languages. This leaflet sets out the rewards to be paid for anyone giving information that allowed security forces to capture or extermination a bandit. The rewards, varying from $30,000 in respect to the Secretary General of the Central Executive Committee, to $1,000 dollars in respect of ordinary party members, were tabulated on special moisture-resisting paper. Most examples of this type date from December 1950.

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Figure 7.   Wanted Communist Terrorists

The leaflet featured in Figure 7: Wanted Communist Terrorists has five boxes for the photographs of communist terrorists on the front and five more on the back. On the front, the first, second and fourth boxes depict the photographs of actual terrorists. The third and fifth boxes have a caricature of a terrorist without a face. The British soldier who found the leaflet has written in ink on the front:

If you see any CTs [Communist Terrorists], give them one each.
All these are big CTs who have been shot.
Then leaflets are dropped on the jungle.

B.   SAMPLE U.S. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN VIETNAM

In this section featuring examples of printed PSYOP products used by American forces during the Vietnam War; graphics, text, and translations were obtained from Lee Richards' section "U.S. Propaganda Leaflets to North Vietnamese, 1961–1975" in the "Aerial Leaflet Propaganda Database" found on the Psywar.org website, which was accessed on October 23, 2010 at http://www.psywar.org/apdsearchform.php?Search=Search&war=Vietnam.

Figure 8.   Remember Your Wife

In Figure 8: Remember Your Wife, a leaflet encouraging the distant soldier to surrender and return to his wife, child, and country is shown. Records indicate that 15 million copies of this leaflet were prepared in December 1967 and disseminated in five parts of South Vietnam. Translated, this leaflet reads:

> Chieu Hoi. Returnees are completely free to build their new lives, and enjoy happiness with their loved ones. Under all circumstances, those who voluntarily come back are WARMLY RECEIVED under the Chieu Hoi Program. You may use this leaflet as a safe conduct pass. Even without a safe conduct pass or leaflet, you are still warmly welcomed.

Figure 9.   Tet Holiday

The leaflet illustrated in Figure 9 emphasizes the fact that if an insurgent takes advantage of the *Chieu Hoi* Program, he could enjoy the Tet Holiday with his family and friends. Translated, this leaflet reads:

> The Hoi Chanh are enjoying a Tet meal at a Chieu Hoi Center. As Tet is coming everybody wants to eat good food, to be reunited with the family, friends, and live a happy life in a secure are of the GVN. Your family needs you and sincerely hopes that you will return to your parents and wife and children. Tet will lack its meaning and your family will be sad if you are not at home. The Chieu Hoi Program of the Government offers you a way back to the Great Nation's Family and to enjoy full citizenship.

Figure 10.   OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

In Figure 10: OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT a leaflet prepared by the 7th PSYOP Battalion for use in OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT is shown depicting a pair of searchlights aimed skyward projecting the *Chieu Hoi* Program's Symbol. Translated, this leaflet reads:

> During the cease fire period of Tan Hoi New Year, all United States, Vietnam, and other Allied bases will turn on their searchlight at night. The searchlight will help you to find freedom. Move toward the direction of light, hide your weapon and wait until the daylight to rally. When getting close to the Government of Vietnam or Allied units, shout aloud "CHIEU HOI." You will be welcomed and receive good treatment. Guide the Government of Vietnam or Allied forces to recover your weapon for a reward.

Figure 11.   Safe Conduct Pass

In Figure 11: Safe Conduct Pass, a 1967 version of the standard safe conduct pass used in Vietnam is shown. This version includes flags of the Philippines and Thailand on one side and a photograph and signature of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu on the other. This leaflet's message is summed up well by the following translation of its first lines: "SAFE-CONDUCT PASS. Return and cooperate with the Government of Vietnam…"

C. SAMPLE U.K. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN KENYA

In this section featuring examples of printed PSYOP products used by the British in the Kenyan Emergency; graphics, text, and translations were obtained from retired Sergeant Major Herbert Friedman's article "PSYOP of the Mau-Mau Uprising" found on the Psywar.org website that was accessed on October 24, 2010 at http://www.psywar.org/maumau.php. The product is a booklet shown in Figure 12 that was disseminated internationally on a limited scale by Kenya's colonial government in as part of their PSYOP campaign to discredit the Mau Mau movement.


Figure 12.   A Colonial Kenyan Government produced anti-Mau Mau booklet

Figure 13.   A leaflet showing the famous Mau Mau leader known as "General China" being given good medical care after entering government custody.

Coming from the collection of British PSYWAR specialist Dr. Rod Oakland, the leaflet in Figure 13 depicts a wounded General China being bandaged. General China (Waruhiu Itote) was the first of the senior Mau Mau guerrilla leaders captured by the government. He was the second in command of their military wing. His legend says that he had been stationed in India as a member of the British Army during World War II and learned how the Haitians had risen in a slave insurrection. A second anecdote has him being lectured on African freedom while helping to put down a revolt in Uganda. In late 1950, he took the Mau Mau oath. He was first assigned 40 men and trained them in the tactics he had learned fighting the Japanese in Burma. Later, he led a large guerrilla force of about 4,000 soldiers on Mount Kenya.

Figure 14.   A Surrender Appeal Leaflet

The leaflet pictured in Figure 14 is all text and signed by General Sir George Erskine, Commander-in-Chief, and by Sir Evelyn Baring, Kenya's Colonial Governor, on January 18, 1955. This leaflet was printed by the government printer in Nairobi for the Department of Information of Kenya. The 193 x 230mm leaflet promises fair treatment for terrorists who surrender. Some of the text in English, Gikuyu, and Swahili translates as follows:

> The Commander in Chief's and Governor's signatures at the bottom certifies that anyone who surrenders will not be punished.

> An Oath not to punish whoever surrenders.

> THE BEARER OF THIS PASS WISHES TO SURRENDER. He is to be given fair treatment, food, and medical attention if needed. He will be detained but he is NOT to be prosecuted for any offenses connected with the Emergency which he may have committed prior to 18 January, 1955.

There is a long message on leaflet's reverse side (pictured to the right in Figure 14). A portion of this text translates as follows:

> To all the Mau Mau leaders and their followers
>
> NEW DIRECTIVES CONCERNING THOSE WHO INTEND TO SURRENDER. This is the time to save your soul! As you know, the government has put great effort in the fight against the Mau Mau and it will continue to pursue and kill those who refuse to surrender.
> THIS IS THE TIME TO SAVE YOUR SOUL. The government has continued to issue directives like this to the leaders and followers of the Mau Mau. If you surrender today and give up all your weapons you will indeed save your soul.
> YOU WILL NOT BE PROSECUTED BECAUSE OF THE MISDEEDS OF THE MAU MAU, NOT EVEN ONCE, IF YOU AGREE TO HONOR THIS OATH. THIS APPLIES AS OF 18 JANUARY 1955. THIS IS A PROMISE TO YOU THAT YOU CAN NOT BE KILLED OR HANGED DUE TO YOUR PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MAU MAU AFTER YOU AGREE TO SURRENDER, ON THE CONDITION THAT YOU NOT REJOIN THE MAU MAU AFTER 18 JANUARY 1955.

This leaflet may or may not be the leaflet mentioned by Donald Barnett as related by Karari Njama in the book *Mau Mau from Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt* by a Guerrilla leader:

> On 18 January we went to visit Gicuki Wacira who lived on the same slop about one mile into the forest fringe. On our way we heard an airplane sky-shouting [loudspeaker] an appeal for us to surrender. As it passed us following the forest border, we saw it dropping thousands of leaflets. I sent one of my escorts to get me a leaflet. It read –

> Government promise
>
> The Kenya Government has offered all the fighters a chance to come out of the forest and return to the normal peaceful life. His Excellency the Governor of Kenya Sir Evelyn Baring has given a general amnesty up to today, 18 January 1955. Save your life now! Surrender with all your fighting weapons and you will not be prosecuted. You will be detained and received good medical treatment, food, clothing and general care.

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(Signed by) Sir Evelyn Baring
His Excellency the Governor of Kenya
General Sir George Erskine
Commander-in-Chief, East Africa[162]

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[162] Don Barnett and Karari Njama, *Mau Mau from Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), 430.

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